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Boston School
Desegregation: The
Fallowness of
Common Ground
by
Robert A. Dentler
Editor's Note: Many of the individuals who were in-
volved in the Boston public school desegregation in the
1970s are critical of the best-selling book about this pe-
riod, Common Ground, by J. Anthony Lukas. Blacks
who were involved with the desegregation efforts since the
1960s assail the book as misrepresenting the black com-
munity and perpetuating racial stereotypes. Announce-
ments have been made concerning plans to produce a tele-
vision docudrama from this book. Consequently, there is
cause for concern about increasing the circulation of any
misrepresentation. The following article examines the
book to see if it provides a "reliable account."
This article is excerpted from a longer essay which ap-
peared in the New England Journal of Public Policy
(1986), 2 (1), 81-102. Dr. Robert A. Dentler, Professor of
Sociology at the University of Massachusetts at Boston,
is the court-appointed expert in the Boston school deseg-
regation case (1975-87) and co-author of Schools on
Trial: An Inside Account of the Boston Desegregation
Case.
This essay scrutinizes the book by J. Anthony Lukas,
Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of
Three American Families, to assess whether it presents a
valid and reliable account of the issues, people, and events
it chronicles. The substantive core of the book is shown to
be the politics ofBoston public school desegregation. The
partsplayed by the threefamilies in this event are dramati-
cally portrayed but cannot be corroborated and are not
interpreted. The parts played by five major policy leaders,
when tested against other evidence, are found to be dis-
torted, questionable legends woven in order to argue that
four of the five leaders made flawed decisions that
plunged Boston into violence. Lukas's docudramatic
method of reporting works to cloak the ignorance, fear,
and hostility of the minority of citizens in the white en-
claves ofBoston who initiated racial violence in the robe of
civic innocence.
Common Ground, by J. Anthony Lukas, a Pulitzer Prize
winning journalist and former reporter for the New York
Times, was published by Alfred A. Knopf and released in
September 1985 to become a best seller in the nonfiction
book trade in less than a month. Excerpts from its 659
pages were printed in advance in the Atlantic, the Boston
Observer, and the Washington Monthly. Within a week of
its release, other sections were published on the Op-Ed
pages of the Boston Globe and the New York Times. A
dozen reviews appeared almost simultaneously with its re-
lease to bookstores, and all of them contained praise. In
his advance appraisal, David Halberstam wrote, "This is a
bittersweet book on the end of an American dream." A
month after publication, the Kennedy Foundation spon-
sored an eleven-member panel of discussants, most of
whom spoke favorably about Common Ground following
a speech by Lukas before a large audience assembled in
the John F. Kennedy Library.
My interest in Common Ground is professional as well
as scholarly. Before coming to Boston in 1972 as dean of
education at Boston University, I had worked on twelve
northern school desegregation cases; and before joining
Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., in January 1975 as one of
two experts he appointed to help plan and oversee his
court orders, I had consulted with Mayor Kevin White,
Governor Francis Sargent, and State Education Commis-
sioner Gregory Anrig, independently of the court.
Anthony Lukas sought me out as a source in 1976, and I
spent many hours answering his questions. The policy
issue for me, therefore, is whether Common Ground
provides an accurate account of the turbulent decade it
aspires to chronicle.
Social and political demography as well as intergroup
history get short shrift from Lukas. Notes on the social
facts about Boston are inserted into every chapter, but
these are seldom expanded upon or integrated into inter-
pretation; indeed, they are subordinated to the drama-
turgy of personal motives. Boston's black residents made
up less than 20 percent of the city in 1960, for example.
Politicians were elected at large, and black voters did not
make up an organized political subcommunity of the city.
Four of the five members of the Boston School Commit-
tee were elected in 1961 and 1963 by white-dominated
ward organizations whose members were patronized in
turn by committee members. Three members struggled to
establish themselves to the right of Louise Day Hicks on
the race issue, and the issue cost Arthur Gartland, the
only moderate member, his seat. The choice before
Louise Day Hicks from 1963 to 1966, then, was not be-
tween racial bigotry, as an act of personal conviction, and
the path of political expediency: the choice for four com-
mittee members, including Hicks, was among degrees of
denial concerning the facts of segregation.
At the time, there were few school committees or
boards of education in the urban Northeast that were be-
having differently. There were a few school superinten-
dents, some groups of parents, and beleaguered moder-
ates on boards, who said that the Brown decision of 1954 1
would come to apply to all parts of the nation. Under
pressure from the New York Board of Regents, for exam-
ple, the city of White Plains desegregated its one identifi-
ably black public school in 1964 by converting it into a
community center. The winds of integration gusted
across the cities and largest suburbs of Pennsylvania, New
York, and Connecticut in those years. A handful of
northern cities and suburbs undertook steps toward par-
tial desegregation from 1963 to 1968, but white resistance
was so deep each year that some civil rights leaders turned
away from this goal and embraced community control
instead. As the 1960s drew to a close, desegregationists
could point with pride to White Plains, Berkeley, Evan-
ston, and Englewood, New Jersey, but no big-city systems
had as yet reformed their racially dual schools.
Nothing distinguished Boston less in 1964 on this issue
than the intransigence of Louise Day Hicks. There were
three or more board members like her on every city school
board from Santa Barbara to Providence in that year. Nei-
ther Mrs. Hicks nor Boston was even the northernmost
case: that distinction went to Minneapolis, where the dis-
pute went to federal court at the close of the 1960s. The
raising of the segregation issue in 1963 and the manner of
white reactions to it over the five years that followed dif-
fered from the same phenomena in dozens of other cities
only in regard to timing. The debate in Boston was com-
paratively belated, and it was insular in scope, failing to
draw heavily on the experience of other urban school
systems.
In his chapter on Louise Day Hicks, Lukas also de-
velops his assumptions about the Massachusetts Racial
Imbalance Act. He characterizes it as the product of
"moral fervor" engendered by the "outrages of Selma . . .
[and] Martin Luther King's impassioned address on the
Boston Common." The coalition of suburban and rural
legislators who passed it, Lukas claims, were happy to
point a finger at the cities. "Few paused to wonder
whether the moral imperatives of the Southern civil rights
struggle could be applied mechanically to a Northern city
where segregation had developed differently," Lukas
writes, but he does not document, let alone identify, the
alleged difference.
Lukas also asserts that the authors of the Racial Im-
balance Act did not pause to ask "whether quality educa-
tion might not be possible in a predominantly black
school." In fact, that question was debated in the course
of framing the law. The question has also been the topic
of continual research, conferencing, and experimentation
among educators and social scientists since the Brown
decision, and it had been treated often in the newspapers
of the day. What is more, no legislation ever passed in Mas-
sachusetts without a coalition among suburban and rural
legislators. Racial segration was an urban issued raised
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by black parents who were concentrated in the cities of
the state. Their leaders took it to the legislature. And there
was nothing mechanical about the new law. It simply
adopted the rule of thumb that identified public schools
enrolling more than 50 percent non-white students as ra-
cially imbalanced, a rule followed in other parts of the
country at that time. This definition had drawbacks, but
mechanicalism and the question of quality education in
predominantly black schools were not among them.
There is but one notable difference between southern
and northern school segregation, and that is in the degree
of explicitness. State laws prohibiting racially mixed
schools in the South seemed important in 1954, but the
importance diminished with every passing year as civil
rights claimants tested the forms of racism common to
social institutions in every region of the United States.
One of those forms has been dealt with in the Brown de-
cision: the argument that racially isolated, racially identi-
fiable black schools could be as effective educationally as
racially inclusive schools. This question was explored and
refuted in the South long before it made its way North.
And it was in the South that segregationists had perfected
the critique of desegregation remedies as mechanical and
therefore harmful.
Thus, the chapter entitled "The Chairwoman" formu-
lates the central subject of Common Ground, and its in-
terpretations guide Lukas into and through the terrain of
that subject, which is court-ordered school desegregation
in Boston. Contrary to his interpretations, Boston was
never on the leading edge of that subject nationally. The
choice of Louise Day Hicks between advocating reforms
consistent with the Brown decision and resisting those re-
forms was not, as Lukas suggests, a fateful one for Boston
or the nation. Nor did her intransigence set into motion
an evolving pattern of rising white resistance to racial in-
justice in Boston. There were not ten elected officials in
any post from mayor to city councilman who were less re-
sistant at the time, and Boston politicians were carried
into and out of office in those years on waves of white fear
and ignorance. Lukas's interpretation that the state legis-
lature, the State Board of Education, and later the state
and federal courts failed to develop rational policies fitted
to northern conditions discloses the flawed quality of his
social history.
Lukas truncates the political history of school desegre-
gation, even though it is his central subject. He does not
trace its evolving features as they moved northward from
Baltimore to New York City in the decade after 1954. He
says of this evolution, "When the legislature passed the
Racial Imbalance Act on August 16, 1965, Massachusetts
became the first state in the Union — and to date the only
one— to outlaw defacto segregation in its public schools."
That act was unique only technically, however, and it was
based on policy commitments made earlier in other states
and localities. Progress in reform was slow, to be sure, but
it came earlier and faster in New York, Connecticut, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California than it did in Massa-
chusetts. The call for racial justice in Boston's public
schools was neither novel nor ahead of its time, and what
distinguished white public reactions in Boston was the
uniformity, not the substance or the intransigence, of
early maneuvers of resistance and avoidance by white
politicians.
The chapter on Judge Garrity includes a capsule his-
tory of Supreme Court desegregation decisions from 1954
to 1974, and on this stands the policy premise of Common
Ground. "By then, the line between de facto and de jure
segregation had become so fine as to be almost indistin-
guishable to the layman's eye. . . . But others . . . thought
it a distinction worth preserving: surely, a free society
ought to defend the right of its citizens to make genuinely
private choices, no matter how reprehensible. If govern-
ment could abolish purely voluntary school segregation
. . . then what was to prevent it from requiring a private
citizen to accept Irish, black, or Portuguese guests at his
dinner table?" Thus, the constitutional rights of private
citizens are pitted against the wrongs of "voluntary" ra-
cial discrimination. The wall erected to prevent this had
been eroded during 20 years of Supreme Court decisions,
and Judge Garrity was chosen by fate to go into the result-
ing breach.
The reader gets but a single sentence of quotation from
the liability opinion given by Judge Garrity in Morgan v.
Hennigan. It is the sentence which concludes that the
Boston School Committee "knowingly carried out a sys-
tematic program of segregation affecting all of the city's
students, teachers and school facilities and . . . intention-
ally brought about and maintained a dual school system."
Although this is the heart of the matter in Common
Ground, the reader receives none of the facts on which
this conclusion was based. Nor do we learn much about
the correctness of the conclusion, only that Thomas At-
kins of the NAACP thought highly of it and that the
court of appeals upheld it.
The tragedy enacted by Judge Garrity, Lukas assures
us, lay not in the finding of liability but in the remedies
adopted to right those wrongs. Unidentified critics are al-
leged to have said the judge wasted his energies on the lia-
bility opinion when he should have spent them on the
search for a remedy. Lukas fails to note that in school de-
segregation disputes, it is the defendant who must fashion
the first remedial proposal and that it was in Boston that
the School Committee refused to do just that.
The tragedies narrated in Common Ground arose, ac-
cording to Lukas, from the juxtaposition of hidden flaws
in individual character and events that conspired against
fulfillment of what would be best for ordinary people.
The book's chronicle relies, therefore, on the selection of
events that seem best suited to express the adverse twists
of fate. For example, Lukas writes that Judge Garrity be-
gan to devise his own permanent remedy long before one
was due from the School Committee. This is simply not
true. He also reports that Garrity's first two choices for
the role of court expert were Thomas Pettigrew and Paul
Ylvisaker, but "both turned him down." In fact, Judge
Garrity never conferred with Pettigrew, and in his meeting
with Ylvisaker, he never broached the subject.
Edward McCormack is featured by Lukas as one of the
four masters appointed by Judge Garrity to make find-
ings of fact and to recommend courses of remedial ac-
tion. McCormack, according to Common Ground, devel-
oped a compromise plan early in 1975 that would have
brought peace as well as racial justice to Boston. The
other three masters are mentioned only once, although
two of them, Charles Willie and Francis Keppel, had deep
expertise in desegregation, while McCormack had never
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dealt educationally or legally with the issue. "Although
the judge had adopted ... a 'team' approach, Eddie
McCormack was clearly first among equals, the team's
unofficial captain." In fact, the presiding master was
Jacob J. Spiegel; and while McCormack was the most
dominating as well as the most creative personality on the
team, he was not the captain. He did not create the ele-
ments of the masters' proposal; did not appraise its edu-
cational consequences; did not do the legal or demo-
graphic research on which it was based; and did not inves-
tigate the prospects for federal aid. These and other vital
tasks were carried out by other team members. McCor-
mack, meanwhile, specialized in testing a wide range of
interest groups and organizations in order to assess and
cultivate their support for the proposal, and he set the
pace of the planning effort.
"This is storybook stuff . . .
fashioned locally . . . for exculpating
Bostoniansfrom the implications of
their own uncompromising commit-
ments to the status quo."
Lukas suggests that Judge Garrity failed to approve [a]
McCormack compromise out of some flaw in character,
some Thomistic or puritanical penchant for caution,
some inherent inability to embrace the practicalities of
compromise. This, he writes, converged with the evolving
rigidities of the Supreme Court and with the raging cross-
pressures blowing across Boston. In this plot, both flaw
and context destroy the last remaining chance for racial
peace.
This is storybook stuff, however. It was fashioned lo-
cally as part of the means for exculpating Bostonians
from the implications of their own uncompromising
commitments to the status quo. Lukas serves as the
chronicling outsider who collects, sifts, and weaves a
more complete fabric of exculpation out of the stuff of
these local legends.
In place of a researched account of the conditions
under which Mayor White changed between 1974 and
1976 from an advocate for racial justice and adherence to
constitutional law into a vigorously defiant opponent of
court actions, Lukas focuses on trivia. He records stories
about White telephoning the Garrity home during a crisis
of racial violence and getting turned away as if White
would really believe he could hold backstage conversa-
tions with a federal judge in the midst of complex civil liti-
gation. Lukas even suggests, without having examined
court documents, that Judge Garrity attached the mayor
as a defendant in the case as a vindictive reaction to the
telephone calls. The course of White's movement from
the liberal center of the controversy toward the outer
edges of the antibusing ideology is not chronicled; in-
stead, the Kevin White in Common Ground fades away
before our eyes. We get snippets about his success in being
reelected in 1976, but the chapter ends with the legend of
his political self-destruction. Once again, the opportunity
to explore the forces at work within a part of the electo-
rate, a part committed to defiant and even violent resis-
tance to desegregation of the public schools, is sacrificed
in favor of the interpretation of flaws in the character of
an individual leader.
The chapter on Thomas Winship, "The Editor," de-
parts from the essentially docudramatic treatment of the
other four leaders. Here, Lukas deals with the career of a
newspaperman and with the impact of school desegrega-
tion on the Boston Globe, a newspaper whose traditions
and content he understands from earned professional
familiarity with urban journalism. Common Ground is at
its best in this chapter. It is one that will be reprinted for
years to come for use in college courses on journalism.
The story of the editor coheres with other parts of
Common Ground'in one important respect, however: it is
devoid of an account of why and how the attacks against
the Globe became so violent and were so long-sustained.
The response of Winship and others on the Globe is cov-
ered superbly. How the paper's leadership fumbled along
the path toward their Calvary, contributing to their own
pain, links this chapter to others as well. Just what it was
that spawned the South Boston lion of violence and what
made it roar with such telling effects is left unexplained,
however, and it becomes hard to link the fortunes of the
Globe to the diverse and volatile subcultures of Boston.
Although Common Ground is the story of school de-
segregation in Boston framed among many subplots, only
two public schools are treated in any detail in the book.
The chronicle of Charlestown High School during the
1974-76 years is strong and fully researched and provides
a glimpse of Lukas's journalistic abilities at their best.
Had he done nothing else during his years on this project,
this chronicle would vindicate his effort. Across the grow-
ing shelf of books and articles about the Boston Public
Schools, nothing equals this reconstruction of daily life in
and around the old high school for precision, relevance,
and selection of detail. Indeed, no other source save the
liability opinion of the federal court offers a fuller ac-
count of the nature and implications of racial segregation
and discrimination and how these ideologies and prac-
tices undermined the learning opportunities for all
students, before and during the earliest period of
desegregation.
Much is gained by intensifying the focus on what jour-
nalists call the human interest elements in Common
Ground, but much is also sacrificed. A reader cannot
learn what transpired in the course of state and federal
court proceedings over the years 1969 to 1978, and what a
reader can learn is factually unreliable. And a reader can-
not learn what in particular it was that the Boston Globe
did in reporting on the dispute that may have contributed
to attacks on the paper, its staff, and its facilities.
In addition to generating a kind of vacuum around the
particulars of policy actions and media actions, Lukas
avoids the question of how unique or representative Bos-
ton is among cities. Shall we read about Boston because
its happenings are unlike those that took place in other
American cities in the same years? This cannot be the in-
tent, surely, because the militancy of opposition to school
desegregation in Pontiac, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Kansas
City, Indianapolis, and San Francisco, to mention places
from diverse regions, was just as fierce and just as depen-
dent on the arguments summarized in the book Disaster
by Decree. 2 So, too, when Lukas reports on how white
youths attacked Rachel Twymon's sister and family when
they moved into a white neighborhood, we recall similar
attacks in Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia.
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"Journalists, unlike social scientists,
are not burdened by disciplinary
responsibilityfor gauging whether
their reports are more or less gener-
alizable ..."
Can it be that we are to take a case study of Boston as
representative of urban America? There is a solid grain of
truth in this idea, but Lukas does not consider it seriously,
and his emphasis upon the historicity of Boston and its
Bunker Hill distracts the reader from considering it. Jour-
nalists, unlike social scientists, are not burdened by dis-
ciplinary responsibility for gauging whether their reports
are more or less generalizable, and one cannot fault Lukas
for working within his professional tradition. Journalists
also do not have to assess whether the stories of one or
two neighborhoods within a city are indicative of the
stories of other parts of the same city, and indeed we learn
little from Common Ground about South Boston, the
core of resistance and defiance toward racial justice, let
alone a dozen other neighboring subcommunities.
Unlike a sociological monograph or a novel by E.L.
Doctorow, Common Ground should be appraised on two
counts: Is its chronicle of what happened accurate, and is
the point of view through which the chronicle is inter-
preted adequate to the scale of the events themselves?
On the first count, Common Ground records many
facts and many statements offered as facts that are in
error. A surfeit of details and conjecture is sometimes
used in preference to a selective decision about which
facts matter. No one needs, for example, to pile a persecu-
tion complex on top of the facts that Cardinal Medeiros
suffered from diabetes and high blood pressure and was
received by some parishioners with manifest hostility in
order to provide an account of his despair. Nor does one
need an account of the Mystery Nighters in order to learn
how Arthur Garrity came to work on campaigns for John
Kennedy. Many details are included because they add to
the human interest factor, no doubt, but the standard of
selection and verification is made of rubber.
On the second count, Common Ground is much
weaker. If we are to read a hundred pages about violent
reactions to changing racial policies, for example, the
factual details presented should point toward something
that is causally commensurate with the scale of the reac-
tions. No evidence is mustered in the chapters on the five
leaders to suggest that one or all of them caused the
bloodshed, terror tactics, sniper attacks, or mob violence
documented in the book. In his book, The Boston School
Integration Dispute, 3 anthropologist J. Brian Sheehan
narrates the same bloody record and finds it necessary to
invent a conspiracy between Yankee Brahmin business
leaders and "black politicians" in order to account for it.
His conspiracy theory is another myth, to be sure, but at
least it has scope.
The family chapters cannot account for the violence,
because none of the families is situated to offer an inter-
pretation. The McGoffs, or Alice and her daughter Lisa
at least, are deeply implicated in desegregation protest
activities, and their story is made exceptionally vivid for
this reason. They were eager to tell Lukas their recollec-
tions years afterward in order to justify their conduct —
indeed, perhaps, to memorialize it with pride.
Mrs. Alice McGoff paid little attention to the school
dispute until the spring of 1973, when she attended a
meeting and heard a Dorchester mother warn that "indis-
criminate mixing of blacks and whites would be a dis-
aster. 'The three R's will be turned to Riot, Rape, and Rob-
bery, she said.' ... To Alice, the idea of sending her chil-
dren to a school halfway across the city when they had a
perfectly good school right across the street was utterly
ridiculous. Moreover, what she knew of conditions in
Roxbury strengthened her resolve . . . she knew it wasn't
safe over there." That is the full reconstruction of her
knowledge and attitudes. It certainly does not suffice as
motivation for what followed.
Kevin White toured a half-dozen cities in the North in
1976 and spoke eloquently on what he called "the disaster
of busing in Boston." At that time he was still mayor. It
was not until 1982 that he made public his conviction that
Boston was a particularly racist city; but when he was
running for office, he could not have been expected to
account for "the disaster" in these terms or even in terms
of voter attitudes. His own public reputation as a political
liberal, while rusting away, made this impossible. And
Edward McCormack, with his close ties to the politics of
South Boston, his lifelong loyalty to his uncle, John
McCormack, and his real-estate as well as political inter-
dependence with Kevin White, did not tell Lukas about
the intensity of rejection accorded the "McCormack com-
promise plan" by South Boston's political leaders, Wil-
liam Bulger and Raymond Flynn.
In a speech at the Kennedy Library, J. Anthony Lukas
said no one should make Judge Garrity a scapegoat for
the wreckage wrought by Bostonians, yet his own sources
and his record of their accounts in Common Ground do
precisely that. They assert that the liability opinion took
too long in coming; that it failed to distinguish between
northern and southern forms of racial segregation; that
the judge adopted the Phase I remedy hastily and without
prudent forethought; that his Phase II remedy was both
rigid and draconian; and that his intrusion into School
Department operations stimulated racial strife. Judge
Garrity is not the only source of the problem: Louise Day
Hicks is deemed a political anomaly rather than the sym-
bol of protest. Cardinal Medeiros, we are told, was a poor
choice on the part of a key person in the Vatican. Kevin
White fails to keep his eye on Boston when his leadership
is needed most. Tom Winship makes the Globe cosmopol-
itan and objective just when some readers yearn most for
parochialism and for coverage that is sympathetic to
protesters.
It is not Lukas who invents the exculpation of those
who acted out the violence in the citywide movement that
came to be named ROAR. His role is that of the visiting
stranger who gathers the wool of exculpation heaped up
by others. If Boston is the unique, historical Cradle of
Liberty its citizens believe it to be, can the relentless hos-
tility toward black parents and students and a small band
of white moderates be reconciled with the image? Will
stories about flawed leaders help restore the loaded sur-
faces of conventional ideology that cover over the realities
of life near Bunker Hill? If the staff and offices of the
Boston Globe are subjected to gunfire, can it be for rea-
sons grounded in the ignorance and fears of subscribers
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who cannot bear to read what the Globe reports? Or shall
the same surfaces of convention be smoothed over by the
excuse that the Globe lost touch with its subscribers?
Common Ground leaves such questions unanswered.
We are left to answer for ourselves why some white stu-
dents at Charlestown High, goaded by their parents,
snubbed, terrorized, and attacked black students inside
and outside the school. We cannot learn from reading this
book how opposition to racial desegregation came to be
carried to such extremes.
Northerners were shocked when similar extremes
flared in Little Rock in 1957; but there, remember, a white
school board and many administrators and teachers had
tried to initiate desegregation, only to be blocked and at-
tacked by Governor Faubus and others in the State
House. Is it possible that the hands that rocked the Cradle
of Liberty were culturally identical to the hands that
blocked the schoolhouse door at Central High School in
Little Rock nearly 30 years ago? None of Lukas's sources
explore this question.
Something that has large potential value or utility but
is being unused is often called fallow. The criminal-court
record in the rape of a white woman by Freddie Twymon
is chronicled in minute detail in Lukas's last chapter on
the Twymon family. Its inclusion in Common Ground is
presumably justified at one level of meaning by the
author's effort to track the lives of every family member.
At another level of meaning, however, this story discloses
the fallowness of the book. We learn what heinous as-
saults took place but not why, whether on the level of
individual psychology or on the plane of Boston and
American society.
Were the sacrifices and gains accomplished by those
who built the civil rights revolution wasted on Freddie
Twymon? Is this story, by any assessment the grimmest
individual behavior recounted in Common Ground, in-
dicative of something, or is it finally meaningless in its
blanketing import of despair? To what extent does the
story sound an echo for the ROAR speaker who equated
the black community with rape and robbery?
It was Martin Luther King, Jr., who revived Gandhi's
dictum that poverty itself is the greatest violence that
human beings wreak upon one another, but Lukas does
not tell his readers what was done to Freddie Twymon that
he would act so. Nor does he probe what was done to Lisa
McGoff that she would lead others to terrorize black stu-
dents. She remembers feeling sickened by being a part of
the protest march in which her schoolmate bludgeoned
black attorney Theodore Landmark with the staff of an
American flag while he was crossing City Hall Plaza on
an innocent mission. By her own account, she was sick-
ened not so much by the violent hatred expressed as by the
realization that its criminality would be used to discredit
her protest.
Lukas's theory of community versus equality defines
community in narrow terms characteristic of closed, ul-
tratraditional neighborhoods organized around ethnic
and class homogeneity. Surely the ideal of community
refers to something grander than tribal attachments to a
place. In any event, it was not the quest for equal educa-
tional opportunity that led to the disintegration of closed
neighborhoods in Boston and other big cities. That
breakdown of barriers began during the dislocations of
the Great Depression and the explosion of social and eco-
nomic change during World War II. Lukas gives us many
"These stereotypes havefunctioned
to rationalize discrimination and
segregation, the methods by which
blacks are oppressed, confined, and
isolated."
details about Charlestown and the South End in support
of this history of deep and irreversible change, and he
shows us how the McGoffs were stranded in a backwater
housing project left over from the 1930s; but he does not
make the mental connections essential to comprehending
how racism, white and black together, is forged in the cru-
cible of a profit-centered, privatistic urban culture.
The question is not one of Tightness or wrongness,
however, nor of sympathies, but of why events went the
way they did in Boston. One cannot answer this by record-
ing what a few respondents say they did and how they felt
about it. Not even the events themselves can be described
validly by this method.
A part of the answer to the question comes from the ef-
fects of racism. Central to racist thought has been the
view that the stereotyped qualities attributed to black
Americans by some white Americans are biologically in-
nate. These stereotypes have functioned to rationalize dis-
crimination and segregation, the methods by which
blacks are oppressed, confined, and isolated. Decades of
racist rhetoric prefigure and drench the issue of school
desegretation in Boston. Pieces of that rhetoric are picked
up by Lukas in his chronicle of Charlestown and in his re-
port on Codman Square in Dorchester. Generally, how-
ever, the substance, pervasiveness, and uses of racist ideas
and actions go unexamined in Common Ground. Those
who can afford to buy the book may include some readers
who keep their stereotypes under firm control as part of a
custom of civility, but Common Ground is not likely to in-
crease their awareness of the damage this ideological vi-
rus can do, whether leashed or unleashed. Colin Diver ex-
periences such an awareness when he feels the agonizing
pressures of defending his property and family from in-
truders. The pain of recognizing his own racism is part of
what motivates him to relocate to Newton from the South
End. This is one of the few contexts in which a major as-
pect of the thoughtways of many Bostonians is presented,
however.
Another explanation of events in Boston surely lies in
the political culture of the city. It was organized for nearly
a century around wards that preserved and patronized the
closed, vertically structured, white ethnic enclaves so bril-
liantly described in Street Corner Society more than 40
years ago. Six of these wards were Irish and two were Ital-
ian. Ordinary citizens at the base of each enclave had
ward bosses and other minor politicians who mediated
their claims with the big bosses downtown. Public offices,
including school principalships and custodial jobs, were
bought and sold in a white marketplace where money,
votes, and loyalties were the currency of exchange. Black,
Hispanic, and Asian households had no place in the polit-
ical culture, which lay like a seamless blanket across all
services that involved public finance, real estate and facili-
ties, and taxation.
From 1950 to 1970, hundreds of thousands of house-
holds relocated from Boston to the suburbs and out of the
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region as well. The aging white population that was left in
the central city grew puzzled, angry toward the relocators
and about themselves, and increasingly antagonistic to-
ward politicians who concentrated less on the neighbor-
hood wards and ever more intensely on the profits to be
taken from downtown renewal, gentrification projects,
and, in the 1960s, federal investments in urban assistance.
Politicians who, like Louise Day Hicks, Albert O'Neil,
Fred Langone, and John Kerrigan, continued to bank on
the white ethnic enclaves found themselves cut off from
the newer, more profitable politics of renewal and finance
under Mayors Collins and White. New school construc-
tion was a part of the new politics, beginning in 1954.
Crumbling and fire-unsafe facilities were left in operation
as part of avoidance of conflict with the enclave dwellers,
while new buildings were placed in ways that reinforced
redevelopment. Some enclaves, such as East Boston and
South Boston, were left out of the redevelopment process,
except where Massport cut into real estate in order to ex-
pand the airport and harbor areas.
Black Bostonians were immaterial, at least until 1965,
to the grinding impasse facing white families who could
not make it out of the crumbling public housing projects
left over from 1937 and the endless miles of wooden,
arson-prone walkups nearby. Until their numbers grew,
blacks were a small, divided minority stuffed away toward
near invisibility when viewed from South Boston. The
march on Selma could be watched on television, but it was
far away. When black parents organized and dared to
press claims for the education of their children, however,
the challenge to white ethnic families became apparent.
What was happening nationwide in the Kennedy and
Johnson years came to Boston. For some white families,
affirmative action and the other trappings of equal treat-
ment seemed to be part of the same plot that caused sub-
urbanization, urban demolition, job insecurity, and the
shredding of such old enclaves as the West End and
Charlestown. That the demolition cut an even broader
swath through black Roxbury provided no comfort.
Unlike Buffalo, a sister city whose economy had been
more severely decimated by the Great Depression, Boston
hosted no sizeable, radically deprived white ethnic sub-
community like the Polish Americans. The Boston Irish,
poor and struggling as they were in the aftermath of
World War II, could take pride in the success of their rise
to political hegemony. When a federal court ordered
school desegregation in Buffalo, the occasion offered re-
newed and enlarged opportunities for Polish-American
children as readily as it did for black Americans, and after
some years of tension, both groups worked collabora-
tively toward that end. Boston, meanwhile, had already
undergone commercial transformation. It was not a rust-
ing manufacturing and steelworking city like Buffalo,
and by 1970 it had become a contender for at least a base-
ment slot in the world-class city competition as a finan-
cial, medical, scientific, and higher educational center. Its
political structure had turned toward federal concerns
with the Kennedys, and its mayors and their aides had
gone to Harvard or M.I.T. What some of the Boston Irish
saw in the racial issue of public schooling was but one
more occasion for a downward slide in their hegemony.
If we can begin to answer why events happened the way
they did, we may also speculate on whether the violence
of 1974 and 1975 could have been prevented. This essay
has argued that the claim that better litigation, better re-
"Given the initial impetus of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, we can spec-
ulate that distributive justice, coupled
with effective housing, transportation,
and education programs, would have
made school desegregation in Boston
a concomitant of urban reconstruc-
tion rather than the result of a court
dispute."
medial plans, and better efforts by city and state authori-
ties could have stemmed the tide of strife is specious. Nor
would a different Cardinal and a different editor of the
Boston Globe have made a difference, either.
Kevin White in 1974 was probably as competent a
mayor as a mayor of Boston could possibly be. He could
have committed to the cause of racial peace the full
weight of his machine, but only in the certain knowledge
that all would be lost for him and for the middle mana-
gers of his organization. Some American cities have had
political leaders who have made such a commitment, but
they can be counted on the fingers of two hands. His suc-
cessor's investment in the politics of antidesegregation
would have been greater than his ever became, substantial
as that was by 1976. The alienation between the white en-
claves and City Hall was in itself too extreme by 1970 to
have made such a choice an effective one, however coura-
geous.
The violence might have been prevented had the federal
government developed and carried out a national urban
policy. Such a policy was beginning to be framed as early
as 1960, parts of it by leaders from Boston, but it was
drained away by the Vietnam War and the privatistic poli-
tics of the Nixon years. Given the initial impetus of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, we can speculate that distribu-
tive justice, coupled with effective housing, transporta-
tion, and education programs, would have made school
desegregation in Boston a concomitant of urban recon-
struction rather than the result of a court dispute. Many
big cities of the North, including Boston, were within
reach of redressing racial wrongs in public education as
part of new school construction and other programs of
the times. By the time of the inner-city riots and burnings
that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King,
Jr., that opportunity had decayed.
When we reflect upon opportunities missed, it becomes
obvious that no contemporary central city in the United
States can be interpreted through the ancient visions of
the Greek city-state, the self-sufficient fortress cities of
medieval Europe, or the shining city on a hill of the Puri-
tans. Boston today is a small dot in the great nexus of an
international commercial and environmental ecosystem,
as it has been since at least 1945. As the world and the na-
tion go now, so goes Boston, a dwindling dot in an ex-
panding metro area. The ignorance, fear, and anger of
those who tried to lock the gates of Charlestown, Dor-
chester, or West Roxbury are the mental and emotional
debris from which an urban legend of innocence is
spawned. J. Anthony Lukas fails to find the facts that
exist in the midst of that debris and that put the rule of
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equal treatment above the custom of special advantage
within the closed neighborhood, no matter how hardened
the crust of local custom has become. Alice McGoff, Lisa
McGoff, and Freddie Twymon, together or apart, cannot
be exculpated. They are what the later decades of the
American twentieth century made them become. With
the Boston Public Schools, as with Watergate, justice
finally prevailed, but not before the worst in many people
crawled out from under the rock of convention.
NOTES
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Once again we assemble here in San Francisco to evalu-
ate what can be done to improve fair treatment and access
for minorities in the establishment media.
At this very same San Francisco Moscone Convention
Center two years ago, the Rev. Jesse Jackson addressed
the Democratic National Convention — and this singular
event proves that America has changed and will continue
to change.
Jackson's impact during that presidential campaign
and at the convention was truly a psychological boost for
blacks and "have-not" Americans and, as he would say,
for the "boats stuck on the bottom."
His presence in that campaign means that black Amer-
ica will never again be locked out of debate on issues in-
volving world affairs, defense, the national budget, fed-
eral judiciary nominations, and our many and varied
domestic concerns.
All of these as well as many other issues, of course, are
often promulgated on the front pages of our newspapers
and on television and radio news programs. The news
media, as we all know, can often very much influence the
very events it calls news. As a person who worked for the
CIA once said, "Information is Power." In that vein, then,
the news media — which gathers an awesome amount of
information — is awesome in its power.
The news media, by print or electronics, influences and
shapes society's attitudes; it is essential then, if not vital,
that the media accurately reflect every aspect of our so-
ciety—including the good, the bad, and the ugly. By keep-
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ing this nation — as well as the world — in its proper con-
text, we can better understand — and thus better solve —
the problems that envelop us, such as racism, sexism, un-
employment, hazardous waste, and the consequences of a
nuclear meltdown.
To help present an accurate picture of who we are and
what's happening around us, the news media need input
from every diverse segment of society— and not merely
from that limited view of society held by many of our un-
enlightened publishers, editors, news supervisors, and
reporters.
Attempts to integrate the newsrooms have met with
only qualified success. As the 1968 Kerner Report told us,
a major contributor to the discontent and resentment of
black Americans was the negative manner in which they
were depicted in the nation's newspapers and on national
television. And often, these one-sided impressions were
created by white editors and reporters who innocently or
deliberately reflected these views in their particular news-
paper, on television, or on radio.
Some argue that if more blacks and other minorities
were not only hired, but promoted to important decision-
making roles, these prejudices and negative reflections
would disappear from the media altogether. Let's talk
about that.
For the sake of this paper, let's say, for instance, that
Katherine Graham of The Washington Post, Arthur Ochs
Sulzberger of The New York Times, Warren H. Phillips of
The Wall Street Journal, Allen H. Neuharth of U.S.A.
Today, William O. Taylor of The Boston Globe, David E.
Easterly of The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Charles T
Brumback of The Chicago Tribune, James M. Moroney,
Jr., of The Dallas Morning News, and Tom Johnson of
The Los Angeles Times decided to promote blacks to top
editor posts.
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